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Wolfhart Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology: A Review

With the appearance in 1961 of Offenbarung als Geschichte by a group of young, German philosophers and theologians (which has since come to be known as the Pannenberg Circle), the theological world received its first significant exposure to a young systematic theologian who would become one of the most important contributors to theology in the twentieth century: Wolfhart Pannenberg. Over the course of a theological career that now spans five decades, he has written prolifically on a broad range of topics from anthropology to ecclesiology, from the reality of the resurrection to the relationship between science and religion. While these writings have often engendered controversy and debate, their thoughtful and provocative themes are not easily ignored, and it is reasonable to predict that theological progress will pass through rather than around Pannenberg’s work. 

It can be reasonably argued that the objective which lies at the very center of Pannenberg’s work is simply to demonstrate the truth content of Christian teaching. There is no attempt to hide behind authorities or to escape the public marketplace of competitive ideas, and the importance of rational inquiry has led P. Clayton to call "pervasive criticizability" a central tenet of Pannenberg's method (C. Braaten and P. Clayton, The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg [Augsburg, 1988] 123). As one might expect, Pannenberg has often been called a rationalist, though his work escapes facile categorization. For example, conservatives have often considered Pannenberg a friend because of his strong defense of the historicity of the resurrection, while they have tended to view askance his position on Scripture. Even with regard to these positions, however, the issues are complex. On Scripture, Pannenberg is often viewed as inadequately conservative by evangelicals, yet too conservative by theological liberals. On the resurrection, evangelicals applaud Pannenberg’s affirmation of its historicity, but shy away from his categorization of the term as metaphorical. 

Between 1988 and 1998, what must surely be considered the magnum opus of Pannenberg’s contribution to the theological enterprise, his three-volume Systematic Theology, appeared in both German and English (Wm.B. Eerdmans, 1991-98). In this essay, we shall make an initial foray into Pannenberg’s theology by way of a brief review of this work. Given that the three volumes run in excess of 1500 pages, our review will necessarily be cursory. Consequently, primary attention will be given to issues wherein Pannenberg offers innovation or attempts to reemphasize themes that he believes the tradition has failed to exploit fully. 

Upon an initial review of volume one of Systematic Theology, one notices immediately that it contains no prolegomenon. In fact, this omission is given explicit attention in a chapter entitled: "The Development and Problem of So-called Prolegomena to Dogmatics" (1:26). Pannenberg argues that, over time, the prolegomenon of dogmatics expanded to include ever more centrally thematic issues. Eventually, the prolegomenon came to be that part of dogmatics that considered the question of the truth of Christian doctrine, and the body of dogmatics became simply the unfolding and interrelating of that doctrine (see, e.g., 1:48). This structuring, Pannenberg claims, is inadequate for one cannot properly separate the question of truth from the systematic presentation of Christian doctrine. In fact, Pannenberg writes that the truth of Christian doctrine is uniquely the concern of the systematic theologian (Introduction to Systematic Theology [Wm.B. Eerdmans, 1991] 7). To grasp what Pannenberg has in mind here, we must briefly consider his theory of truth. 

Pannenberg writes that coherence is the final criterion of truth. Since it is the nature of truth to be non-contradictory, the final criterion applied to a body of propositions purported to be true is: Do these truth claims cohere? In relating this to systematic theology, Pannenberg quotes Buddeus with approval: Systematic theology must offer a comprehensive and coherent presentation of Christian teaching (1:18). We must be careful not to draw the conclusion from these arguments that Pannenberg is an epistemological coherentist in the traditional sense. The fact that Pannenberg agrees that some propositions are privileged suggests that his theory also has foundationalist characteristics. Coherence is the final criterion for truth, not the only one. 

Another important aspect of Pannenberg’s theory of truth derives from his appropriation of the work of W. Dilthey. Dilthey argued that the meaning, and therefore the truth, of events is determinable only in light of the contexts within which the events are set. Further, since the occurrence of new events lead to new, more comprehensive contextual horizons, Dilthey argued that one could definitively know the meaning of one’s life only by looking backwards from the moment of death when all life’s events are placed within a contextual whole. Pannenberg expands this to argue that the truth/meaning of all history can only be grasped from a point when no further transcendence of the present can occur—specifically, from the eschatological consummation of history. Consequently, Pannenberg holds that present truth claims are provisional and will be finally settled only with the appearing of the eschaton. 

One consequence of this understanding of truth is that the debatability of God’s existence remains a part of human experience throughout the march of history. Various events in the course of human history cohere with the claim that God exists and exercises lordship over the cosmos. However, it is only as the deity and lordship of God are confirmed by the outworking of history and, finally, the full revelation of God at the eschaton that these issues are forever laid to rest. For Christians, however, the resurrection of Christ serves as the hermeneutical tool whereby we draw our conclusions about matters—even in the present—for it is precisely in the resurrection that the eschaton makes an appearance in history. 

A central theme of Pannenberg’s theology is the futurity of God; e.g., Pannenberg has written that God is the power of the future. Arising from this position is an assertion that has both delighted and frustrated students of Pannenberg: The future has ontological priority over the present. However, a few have seen that such a claim follows from Pannenberg’s theory of truth. If the meaning/truth of an event is definitively determinable only from the end, then the end has priority over all present times from the standpoint of meaning/truth. Some has asked whether this is not more accurately called an epistemological rather than an ontological priority. However, Pannenberg does not allow such a distinction to be drawn—things are precisely what they mean. Additionally, the question of the missing wholeness of creaturely existence (the threat of death, lack of fulfillment, etc.) are only answered eschatologically. Finally, even God’s deity, since it is only definitively revealed in the eschaton, suggests a priority for the future. The theme of the futurity of God makes an appearance in several locations throughout the three volumes—primarily in relation to the doctrine of God in vol. 1, relating to anthropological concerns in vol. 2, and, of course, in Pannenberg’s discussion of eschatology in vol. 3. 

Perhaps the most significant proposal Pannenberg advances is the utilization of the concept of infinity as the central concept in articulation of the Christian doctrine of God. While the divine infinity has generally been taken as secondary within the tradition, Pannenberg recognizes the contribution of Gregory of Nyssa who first considered infinity as the primary concept in the doctrine of God (1:342-47). In providing logical analysis of the concept of infinity, Pannenberg draws upon the insights of Hegel, who recognized that to separate the finite and the infinite firmly is to create a boundary for the infinite. This, of course, makes the infinite a bounded thing and, thereby, finite. Hegel draws the conclusion, and Pannenberg agrees, that that which is truly infinite must not merely stand opposed to the finite, but must also overcome the opposition and thereby appear on the side of the infinite as well. This understanding of the infinite, Pannenberg believes, has a number of important consequences. 

For example, Pannenberg argues that it follows, from a proper understanding of the divine infinity, that if God is to be conceived as infinite (and as One), an adequate doctrine of God must provide a means of conceptualizing God as a differentiated unity. Enter the doctrine of the Trinity, which Pannenberg calls "concrete monotheism" as opposed to abstract monotheisms which do not provide a grounds for properly accounting for the divine infinity. Pannenberg argues that it is the Father who remains transcendent while the Son and the Spirit become immanent to the creatures. Consequently, the persons of the Trinity together account for the divine infinity. Pannenberg uses the "true Infinite" as a means to unfold various aspects of his theology. One of the more enlightening is his discussion of how infinity relates to the divine attributes. Consider, for example, his discussion of God’s omnipotence. One-sided understandings of the divine infinity lead to confrontational understandings of God’s power, which is seen as a power that crushes all opponents. The bipolar nature of the true infinite recognizes that, through the Son, the divine omnipotence appears with the creatures as a saving power aimed at rescuing them. Further, as the Spirit is shed abroad in the hearts of believers, the divine omnipotence pervades that which is fallen and corrupt and makes it holy. It will be interesting to see how the tradition responds to Pannenberg’s call to a re-emphasize the divine infinity. 

If this proposal is the most significant, then surely the most provocative and controversial is his call to reconceptualize God as an infinite field of power (see, e.g., 2:79-102). An important part of Pannenberg’s discussion here is his concern that the concepts of mind and will are inadequate to the divine being. Both concepts, according to Pannenberg, are overly anthropomorphic, and lose much of their common meaning when applied to God. Further, the concept of an infinite field of power, Pannenberg argues, opens up space to connect science and theology. Science had attempted to trace all forces to prior bodies. However, beginning with M. Faraday, physicists began to reverse this relationship so that bodies are now conceived as manifestations of prior fields. If bodies have priority over fields so that all fields of force derive from bodies, the interaction of an incorporeal entity (namely, God) with physical bodies is problematic. However, if fields are primary, so that bodies are traceable to those prior fields, causal activity by an incorporeal entity becomes intelligible. Further, as pointed out above, Pannenberg believes that this reconceptualization draws theories from the natural sciences into the use of theology (2:83). 

As one might expect, a serious objection that has been raised with regard to this proposal is, Can the personality of God be preserved? After all, a field of power certainly sounds impersonal, and Pannenberg agrees that the concept of God must involve personality. However, he argues that the origins and nature of personality provide resources for overcoming this objection. In the final analysis, the extent to which this reconceptualization will be found adequate will depend upon the persuasiveness of Pannenberg’s defense of God’s personal nature. 

Perhaps the aspect of Pannenberg’s theology which has been most criticized by evangelical theologians is his treatment of Scripture. While I do not argue that they entirely blunt the force of the objection, there are a few points that ought to be considered before one draws final conclusions. First, one only need casually peruse the 1500+ pages of Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology to see the extent to which he utilizes the Scriptures in his unfolding argument. There are in excess of 3500 separate citations. This is hardly the practice of one who lightly regards the question of the authority of Scripture. Second, Pannenberg does not argue against the claim that the Scriptures are inspired, but rather against using the claim of inspiration as a means of presupposing their truth. As we have already noted, Pannenberg believes that the fundamental task of the systematic theologian is to demonstrate the truthfulness of the Christian faith. Do not, then, the Protestant doctrine of the inspiration of Scripture and Pannenberg’s enterprise share this goal: to show that Christianity is true? Third, and closely related to these first two points, it is important to note that Pannenberg distinguishes between two aspects of Scripture. On one hand, as we have seen, he considers the truthfulness of Scripture an area of inquiry for the systematic theologian. On the other, Pannenberg steadfastly affirms that the Scriptures are normative for what constitutes the Christian faith. This, of course, does not remove all differences between Pannenberg and evangelicals—e.g., many would remain uncomfortable with his embrace of historical-critical interpretive tools. Further, many object that he has exalted reason above Scripture. Nevertheless, neither should we exaggerate the differences. 

Finally, there is a very powerful image of the judgment that Pannenberg records toward the end of vol. 3 which is worthy of consideration (3:610). Imagine that our life’s every word, deed, and thought are translated into a piano sonata. Whenever our words, deeds, and actions are consistent with each other and the good, they make a harmonious sound, but when these stand in contradiction to each other or the good, the result is a shrill and discordant sound. Pannenberg, then, simply asks: Will our life generate harmonious praise of God? Or, will it be a shrill sound, painful for us and God to hear? It is a sobering image, is it not? For believers, the judgment will prove to be a purifying event in that Christ will purge our sonata of its discord. The question, however, consistent with 1 Corinthians 3, is, What will be left after the purifying fire? Anything of value to offer God? Or, merely one who is saved "as if by fire"? 

What I have presented here is merely an introduction to selected themes that appear in the three volumes of Pannenberg’s Systematic Theology. The doctrines of ecclesiology, soteriology, and creation, for example, have not been broached. Even the doctrine of the Trinity, which Pannenberg holds to be the core of Christianity’s doctrine of God, has received only passing mention. Finally, I have made critical interaction secondary. Pannenberg’s arguments are often complex and heavily laden with examination of the history lying behind various doctrinal developments, and my goal has simply been to invite the reader to examine and critique them for him- or herself. There can be little doubt that history will record Pannenberg as one of the major thinkers of twentieth-century theology. With the publication of his Systematic Theology, Pannenberg invites us to stand upon his shoulders as we strive to expand our understanding of the One God—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, to Whom be glory and honor forever and ever. Amen. 

By Charles E. Gutenson, Ph.D. (cand.), Southern Methodist University, and John Wesley Fellow; Adjunct Professor of Philosophical Theology, Asbury Theological Seminary and Asbury College.